The U.S. Navy has recently faced criticism for concentrating too much on the Middle East at the expense of the Asia-Pacific theater. The U.S. Marine Corps, however, cannot be accused of such neglect. In 2019 the Marines unveiled a new concept that relies on widely dispersed units equipped with drones and anti-ship weapons to operate across island chains, aiming to disrupt Chinese maritime ambitions. As the Corps fields these novel capabilities at the sharp edge of U.S. force posture, Chinese military analysts have paid close attention. The following summarizes several assessments published in Chinese-language outlets.
About a year ago, the Global Times ran an unusually pointed editorial condemning Washington’s new willingness to position anti-ship missiles close to Chinese shores. That piece argued the U.S. was shifting emphasis away from “open-ocean control” toward fighting in confined waters and near choke points. The article warned that attempts to dominate maritime bottlenecks would limit rivals’ freedom of movement at sea and introduce new security risks for the region.
A much more detailed appraisal appeared in early 2025 in the naval journal Modern Ships. That analysis expressed alarm over Marine experimentation with unmanned surface vessels armed to carry the low-observable LRASM anti-ship cruise missile, noting these craft could also operate as forward sensors that help cue distant U.S. fires. At the same time, the piece pointed out limitations in the Marine concept—particularly constraints on the detection ranges of associated sensors and drones—and even labeled aspects of the Corps’ air-defense posture as fragile. An earlier article in the same publication had highlighted the logistical headaches the concept creates.
A 2026 critique in another navy-linked periodical, Shipborne Weapons, was even sharper. The author contended that forming the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) effectively amounts to preparing campaigns that could be used to intervene militarily in China’s reunification issues. The study first noted that many U.S. think tanks had already voiced skepticism about the concept, arguing that relying on forward bases without assured sea and air superiority might be impractical or unsustainable.
That analysis also acknowledged an important tactical advantage of the Marine approach: the new mobile missile launchers are relatively small and lightweight, making them difficult to detect with standard surveillance means. Still, the paper concluded the overall posture was vulnerable because the United States lacks a rapid means of obtaining air dominance; achieving it, the author warned, could take weeks or months and exact heavy losses.
One particularly noteworthy article—recently translated and published by the China program at the U.S. Naval War College—was originally written by senior, active-duty officers of the Chinese Navy and first circulated in a restricted Chinese military journal. That provenance makes its arguments especially significant.
Although the piece avoids directly addressing Taiwan and explicitly states the Marine concept aims at deterrence, it portrays U.S. forward deployments as a form of “continuous intrusion” into China’s near waters and urges Beijing to devise effective countermeasures. The authors draw a direct connection between the Marine deployments and China’s developing submarine force, suggesting forward Marine outposts could seed hydro-acoustic arrays and similar equipment to create barrier zones and monitoring belts to track Chinese submarines. They also argue that American forces could try to blunt Chinese air defenses using drone swarms to overload radar and tracking systems.
The Chinese naval officers caution against expending scarce, high-value platforms to meet these asymmetric U.S. tactics. Yet, troublingly, their conclusion calls for a more assertive Chinese response: adopting a proactive offensive stance, expanding operational reach, and pushing forces outward. In their words, China should “maintain and normalize forward-deployed units” and push undersea combat capabilities as far forward as possible.
These Chinese-language studies pose uncomfortable dilemmas for U.S. defense planners. The Naval War College translation implies that Beijing’s navy might respond to American forward-leaning measures with its own more aggressive posture—an example of the classic security dilemma, where one side’s attempts to bolster its defense prompt countermeasures that raise overall tensions. Chinese analysts also clearly recognize the vulnerabilities of dispersed Marine elements—logistical fragility and inadequate integrated air and missile defenses. History provides precedents where Marine deployments in East Asia were conducted with inadequate planning, at considerable human cost.
Given these dynamics, U.S. policymakers should consider adjusting course. One option is to reduce reliance on forward-hardened defensive positions. Alternatively, the Marine Corps could lean into the Pacific’s strategic depth—working with archipelagic partners such as the Philippines—to develop an approach that is cheaper, lower risk, more sustainable over time, and unmistakably defensive in character.
Lyle Goldstein is director of the China Initiative at Brown University’s Watson School and concurrently serves as director of the Asia Program at the think-tank Defense Priorities.
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Jamal Peterson reports on defense, aerospace, and tech policy. With a military background and a strategic mind, he dissects complex subjects with clarity, offering readers sharp, reliable insights.
