Urgent Call for More THAAD Interceptors: Strengthening Defense Capabilities Now!

The inventory of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) “Talon” interceptors, managed by the U.S. Army, is critically low, posing a significant risk to American forces in potential future conflicts. This shortage became particularly evident after the U.S. military utilized nearly a quarter of its interceptor stockpile during the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran in June. Without swift and significant intervention from Congress, replenishing and increasing the interceptor supply may take too long.

In a recent move, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency entered into a contract modification worth $2.06 billion for the production of THAAD “Talon” interceptors. Although this is a positive development, it alone is not enough. Congress must act by approving the administration’s request to reallocate funds across programs to secure additional interceptors. It is crucial to ensure sufficient budgetary allocation to acquire the maximum number of interceptors that can be produced in the next fiscal year, and to urge both the Pentagon and defense contractors to scale up production capabilities as fast as possible.

THAAD is a domestically produced, land-based missile defense system designed to neutralize short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles both within and outside the earth’s atmosphere. The U.S. Army currently operates eight THAAD batteries, each comprising six launchers with eight interceptors each, totaling 48 interceptors per battery. THAAD is an integral component of the Army’s layered land-based theater ballistic missile defense system, augmented by the Patriot system and complemented by naval interceptors like the SM-3 and SM-6.

In the conflict in June, Iran is reported to have launched over 500 ballistic missiles at Israel and around a dozen at a U.S. airbase in Qatar, resulting in significant damage including the destruction of a geodesic dome. The U.S. supported Israel by deploying several THAAD batteries to the Middle East and successfully intercepted many missiles, showcasing the system’s effectiveness and interoperability within a broader defense architecture.

The exact number of THAAD interceptors used is not publicly confirmed, but according to The Wall Street Journal, citing sources within the U.S., over 150 interceptors were launched. Given the Pentagon’s previous commitment to fund 646 interceptors, as noted in their fiscal 2026 budget documents from June 2025, the use of 150 interceptors represents approximately one-fourth of the entire THAAD inventory.

The question arises as to why the U.S. maintains such a limited stockpile of interceptors.

Prior to the 12-Day War, the Pentagon had requested funding for only 25 interceptors in the base defense budget for FY26, with an additional 12 requested through reconciliation, totaling 37 interceptors. This number, while an increase from the 11 interceptors requested in FY24 and 12 in FY25, is grossly inadequate. At this rate, it would take approximately four years just to replace the interceptors used during the 12-Day War. With escalating threats in the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific, such a slow replenishment rate is untenable.

The potential risks are even greater when considering potential conflicts with nations like China, which has about 2,700 ballistic missiles of varying ranges and continues to expand its arsenal.

Moreover, Russia has reportedly more than doubled its ballistic missile production from 2023 to 2024, as per Ukrainian intelligence reports. North Korea also persists in advancing its missile capabilities, posing a continued threat to regional stability and U.S. security.

Fortunately, there are viable steps to bolster the U.S. Army’s THAAD interceptor reserves.

An immediate action Congress can take is to approve the reprogramming request submitted on July 15, which would expedite the acquisition of additional interceptors, in light of the Missile Defense Agency’s recent $2.06 billion contract modification.

Furthermore, for FY26, it is essential that Congress not only approve the necessary funding for the maximum number of interceptors that can be produced—which is currently 96 per year but could increase to 144—but also encourage further increases in production capacity.

While some of the current production is allocated to fulfilling foreign military sales, notably to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, these orders have helped maintain production capabilities that might otherwise have diminished due to reduced U.S. orders.

To facilitate and motivate increased production, Congress should use its authority to signal a long-term commitment to purchasing these interceptors, which will in turn incentivize the industry to invest in expanding their production capacity.

Moreover, Congress should mandate the Pentagon to provide an annual report detailing the current maximum production levels of THAAD interceptors and the steps being taken to enhance this capacity.

The Senate Appropriations Committee recently approved an additional $923 million for more THAAD interceptors and related expansions on July 31, a move that should be supported by the entire Congress and the administration.

It is clear that the U.S. has not invested sufficiently in its missile defense capabilities for some time, and it is now seeing the repercussions of this neglect. However, with decisive action now, it is still possible to rectify this situation and ensure American forces are better protected in future conflicts.

Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, with Ryan Brobst as deputy director. Luke Miller, an intern at CMPP, also contributed to this analysis.